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abstract
Arendt claims that our natality (i.e., our condition of being born) is the “source” 
or “root” of our capacity to begin (i.e., of our capacity to initiate something new). 
But she does not fully explain this claim. How does the capacity to begin derive 
from the condition of birth? That Arendt does not immediately and unambiguously 
provide an answer to this question can be seen in the fact that her notion of natality 
has received very different interpretations. In the present paper, I seek to clarify the 
notion. I bring together and examine Arendt’s scattered remarks about natality and 
propose a new interpretation that responds to the stated question. Along the way, I 
show how the various existing interpretations have arisen and argue that, in view of 
that question, they are inadequate.
Keywords: H. Arendt, capacity to begin, natality, plurality
resumen
Arendt afirma que nuestra natalidad (es decir, la condición de haber nacido) es la “fuente” 
o “raíz” de nuestra capacidad para comenzar (a saber, de nuestra capacidad para ini-
ciar algo nuevo). Sin embargo, ella no explica esta afirmación a cabalidad. ¿Cómo es 
que la capacidad para comenzar deriva de la condición de nacimiento? Debido a que 
Arendt no proporciona una respuesta inmediata y clara a esta pregunta, su noción de 
natalidad ha sido interpretada de maneras muy diferentes. Este trabajo busca aclarar 
la noción. Se reúnen y se examinan los comentarios dispersos de Arendt acerca de la 
natalidad y se propone una nueva interpretación que responde a dicha pregunta. En 
el proceso, se demuestra cómo surgieron las diversas interpretaciones existentes y 
se argumenta que son inadecuadas.
Palabras clave: H. Arendt, capacidad para comenzar, natalidad, 
pluralidad. 
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“Natality” is one of Arendt’s most prominent notions. Alongside 
“action in concert”, “the plurality of human beings”, and “the banality 
of evil”, it is one of the notions with which her thought is most often 
and most readily associated. Some commentators even consider it her 
most important notion, her most defining contribution.1
The starting point of the present paper is the observation that it 
is not clear how the notion of natality is to be understood, despite the 
fact that Arendt employs it frequently. There is a puzzle at the core of 
the notion, a question that Arendt’s remarks about natality provoke but 
do not readily resolve. The puzzle, in a nutshell, is this: Arendt defines 
“natality” as the condition of having been born (cf. 1958 8; 1965 211; 1996 
51; 2006 174, 196). And she asserts that our natality is the “source” or 
“root” of our “capacity to begin” (cf. 1958 247; 1965 211; 1966 466, 479; 
1972 179; 1981 ii 6). (By “capacity to begin”, she means the capacity to 
break with the status quo and initiate something new. Only human 
beings possess this capacity, according to her.) So Arendt is claiming 
that our capacity to begin springs from our condition of having been 
born. But this claim is not evident, and Arendt does not fully explain 
it. What is the connection between the capacity to begin and the con-
dition of birth? How does this capacity derive from the way in which 
we come into the world?
That Arendt’s remarks about natality do not immediately and un-
ambiguously provide an answer to this question can be seen in the fact 
that the notion has received very different interpretations. Some see 
it as establishing a link between nature and politics and, hence, as in 
tension with the opposition of nature and politics that Arendt posits 
elsewhere (cf. Jay 1985; Birmingham 2003, 2006; Vatter 2006; Quintana 
2009). Others treat “natality” as a synonym for the capacity to be-
gin and thus, implicitly, take the notion to be metaphorical in nature 
 I would like to thank Penelope Deutscher, Bonnie Honig, Mary Dietz, Dagmara 
Drążewska, and the reviewer for Ideas y Valores for their feedback on earlier versions 
of the paper. Furthermore, I would like to thank Paula Hunziker and Laura Arese for 
inviting me in 2015 to present a draft of the paper at the Jornadas Arendt in Córdoba, 
and my audience on this occasion for the helpful questions and comments. Without 
their encouragement and critique, this project would not have come to fruition.
1 To cite a few examples: Hauke Brunkhorst called the notion of natality “the essen-
tial innovation of Arendt’s political anthropology in The Human Condition” (188), 
Fernando Bárcena saw in it “el concepto central y la piedra angular de todo el edificio 
del pensamiento arendtiano” (111), and Pablo Bagedelli presented it as “el elemento 
fundamental para entender la manera en que [Arendt] se posiciona frente a la filosofía 
occidental” (38). Patricia Bowen-Moore (1989) dedicated an entire book to it, which 
she entitled Hannah Arendt’s Philosophy of Natality. And Peg Birmingham found 
that “without exaggeration, Arendt’s thinking can be characterized as a ‘thinking 
of natality’” (2003 54).
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(cf. Beiner 1984; Bowen-Moore 1989; Brunkhorst 2000; Dietz 2002; 
Tassin 2003; Lenis Castaño 2009; Biss 2012). And there are further in-
terpretations which do not fall into either of these groups (cf. Markell 
2016; Van Camp 2014).
In this paper, I seek to clarify the situation. I will bring together and 
examine Arendt’s scattered remarks about natality and propose a new 
interpretation that addresses the puzzle I have highlighted. Along the 
way, I will show how the various existing interpretations have arisen, 
and why, in the light of that puzzle, they are inadequate.
Preliminary: The human capacity to begin
Before I can discuss the notion of natality, I need to set out Arendt’s 
conception of the capacity to begin, since this conception is essential 
for an understanding of natality.
Arendt holds that what is special about human beings, what distin-
guishes us from other animals, is the “capacity to begin”, by which she 
means the capacity to leave behind the status quo and create something 
new, the capacity to go against and beyond the usual course of affairs. 
She expresses this view most explicitly when, at the beginning of The 
Human Condition, she remarks that “action”, which for her is synony-
mous with beginning, is “the exclusive prerogative of man; neither a 
beast nor a god is capable of it” (1958 22-23).2 At the very end of Origins 
of Totalitarianism, she similarly asserts that “beginning […] is the su-
preme capacity of man” (1966 479). And in “Understanding and Politics”, 
she even employs the term “essence” in this respect, characterizing the 
human being as “a being whose essence is beginning” (1994 321).
As a consequence of this conception of the human being, Arendt 
distinguishes between two modes of human activity. As I just noted, 
she reserves the term “action” for the exercise of the capacity to begin. To 
act, for her, is to take initiative, to intervene in a situation or process 
that would otherwise unfold according to usual practices. By contrast, 
to comport oneself according to custom, to follow the social rules and 
norms of the day, does not qualify as action but is mere “behavior” (1958 
40-43). So, even though the capacity to act is what defines the human 
being, the exercise of this capacity is in fact something exceptional. In 
other words, action is inherently rare, as our doings mostly follow well-
established practices.3
2 For Arendt’s identification of action with beginning, see 1958 177-178, 1972 179, 1994 
320-321.
3 Here I leave aside the question of how this dualistic distinction between action and 
behavior relates to Arendt’s better-known triadic distinction between action, work, 
and labor.
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The prime manifestation, for Arendt, of the human capacity to 
begin is a political revolution. She devoted a book-length study, On 
Revolution, to the grand revolutions of the modern age –the American, 
French, Russian, and Hungarian revolutions.4 In these events, the hu-
man capacity to break with the past and make a new beginning has been 
most conspicuous. However, her notion of beginning also applies on 
a smaller scale. The site of engagement need not be national or world 
politics. It may be your neighborhood, or your workplace, or your uni-
versity. For example, at a meeting, to speak up and take a stand against 
the predominant opinion rather than to let the meeting run its predict-
able course, or, when witnessing an instance of police abuse, to stop and 
intervene rather than to move along as you are supposed to, or, at its 
smallest, to engage with a person living on the street whom everyone 
else ignores –such deeds are no less exercises of the capacity to begin, 
and hence instances of action as opposed to behavior.5 They may at first 
be individual, isolated acts, but they may then inspire others to join in 
and thus give rise to a larger, concerted endeavor.
The puzzle: The capacity to begin is rooted in natality
Having presented Arendt’s conception of the capacity to begin, I 
can now turn to her notion of natality.
If we go by the etymology of the word, “natality” –from the Latin 
natus, “born”– simply means the fact that we human beings come into 
the world through birth, just as “mortality” means the fact that we 
leave the world through death. And indeed, Arendt defines natality 
as “the fact that human beings appear in the world by virtue of birth” 
(1965 211; cf. 1958 8, 1996 51, 2006 174, 196).
This is a very clear and unambiguous definition. So where does 
the problem lie?
The problem arises from what Arendt says about the significance 
of natality. The attributed significance does not seem to fit the stated 
definition. In other words, there is an apparent mismatch between what 
natality is said to be (the definition) and what it is said to entail (the sig-
nificance). What I am referring to is Arendt’s claim that our capacity to 
begin is, as she puts it in The Human Condition, “ontologically rooted” 
in natality, that we “are capable of [action] by virtue of being born” (1958 
247). Arendt thus maintains that our capacity to begin derives from the 
fact that we come into the world through birth. We find this claim not 
only in The Human Condition, but in all of her major works, albeit each 
4 Notably absent from the book is any mention of the Haitian Revolution.
5 The examples given here are my own, not Arendt’s.
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time worded differently.6 Let me cite the most important passages in 
this respect, as they will serve as points of reference in what follows:
[The freedom of man] is identical with the fact that men are being 
born and that therefore each of them is a new beginning, begins, in a 
sense, the world anew. […] [T]he very source of freedom is given with 
the fact of the birth of man and resides in his capacity to make a new be-
ginning. (Arendt 1966 466)
Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme ca-
pacity of man; politically, it is identical with man’s freedom. Initium ut 
esset homo creatus est –“that a beginning be made man was created” said 
Augustine. This beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed 
every man. (Arendt 1966 479)
The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from 
its normal, “natural” ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the 
faculty of action is ontologically rooted. It is, in other words, the birth of 
new men and the new beginning, the action they are capable of by virtue 
of being born. (Arendt 1958 247)
The very capacity for beginning is rooted in natality, in the fact that 
human beings appear in the world by virtue of birth. (Arendt 1965 211)
Philosophically speaking, to act is the human answer to the condition 
of natality. Since we all come into the world by virtue of birth, as new-
comers and beginnings, we are able to start something new; without the 
fact of birth we would not even know what novelty is, all “action” would 
be either mere behavior or preservation. (Arendt 1972 179)
No doubt every man, by virtue of birth, is a new beginning, and his 
power of beginning may well correspond to this fact of the human con-
dition. (Arendt 1981 ii 6)
In these passages, Arendt discusses the connection between natal-
ity and the capacity to begin as if her remarks were obvious, as if they 
did not require further explanation. Yet in fact they are not obvious but 
rather puzzling.7 What exactly is the connection between the capacity to 
6 Pablo Bagedelli has pointed out that the notion of natality had a peculiar trajectory 
within Arendt’s oeuvre. After having been developed in The Human Condition, the 
notion spread to her past works, in the sense that Arendt incorporated it in revisions 
of two earlier writings, namely in the second edition of Origins of Totalitarianism and 
in the reworking of her doctoral dissertation on Augustine’s conception of love (cf. 
Bagedelli 38-39).
7 The puzzle has been highlighted by Patchen Markell. Markell notes that Arendt uses 
the notion of natality to connect the capacity to begin to the fact of birth, but that “the 
precise nature of this connection is uncertain”. He then goes on to propose an answer 
to the puzzle, yet his proposal does not, in my eyes, clarify the issue. He asserts that, on 
his reading, “to call natality in the sense of birth a ‘condition’ of beginning would be to 
[333]Arendt’s Notion of Natality
ideas y valores • vol. lxvi • n.o 165 • diciembre 2017 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso) 2011-3668 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 327 - 346
begin and the condition of birth?8 How does this special human capacity 
derive from the particular process by which we come into the world?9
Every (human) birth is a new beginning
Arendt suggests in her remarks an answer to this question. She says 
that we are, each of us, through birth, a new beginning (cf. 1966 466, 
1972 179, 1981 ii 6). Apparently it is this claim that is meant to establish 
the connection between the fact of birth and the capacity to begin. So 
Arendt’s argument seems to be the following: We possess the capacity 
to make a new beginning because we are, each of us, through birth, a 
new beginning.
But this first answer provokes a further question: In which sense is 
each of us, through birth, a new beginning? What makes this question 
particularly acute is that the claim about birth being a new beginning 
seems to be in contradiction with a fundamental element of Arendt’s 
thought, namely her opposition between life and action. Arendt sees 
a stark contrast and tension between the circularity and repetition of the 
life process and the linearity and innovation of action (cf. 1958 70, 119, 
1965 60-61, 112, 2005 116-117, 148-149, 2006 147). Understood as the bio-
logical process of parturition, birth is hence not a new beginning in 
Arendt’s sense. It is not something extraordinary, not a disruption or 
transcendence of the status quo. To the contrary, it is a necessary part 
of the cycle of life, a recurring moment in the endless cycle of genera-
tion and destruction. It is therefore the very opposite of a beginning 
in her sense.
The solution of the apparent contradiction is that, when Arendt says 
that every birth is a new beginning, she is referring to human birth, 
not birth per se. In other words, not the mere biological process of par-
turition but the advent of another human being is a new beginning for 
say that birth is the fundamental phenomenon on the basis of which [the irreducible 
difference introduced by a happening] becomes meaningful: it is that in virtue of which 
the actuality of events acquires its weight” (Markell 7). I find this statement completely 
obscure. In what way does the fact of birth constitute the basis on which events acquire 
meaning and weight?
8 Bhikhu Parekh has criticized Arendt for the lack of clarity on this question. He finds 
the notion of natality “rather confused”, noting that “it is difficult to see why the fact 
that men are born should ‘prompt’ them into any kind of action” (104).
9 Tellingly, Arendt admits at the very end of The Life of the Mind, on the last page she 
wrote in her life, that she is “quite aware” that the argument about natality is “somehow 
opaque” (1981 ii 217). This statement is very surprising. Why does she acknowledge that 
the argument is opaque only at such a late stage, after having adduced it so many times, 
in every major work? Whatever the answer to this question may be, I want to show in the 
present paper that the argument is not entirely opaque, that a coherent line of reasoning 
can be reconstructed from her remarks.
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her. In The Human Condition, we find a passage where she makes that 
explicit, a passage where she indicates that she uses the word “birth” 
in a specific sense that only applies to human beings:
Nature and the cyclical movement into which she forces all living 
things know neither birth nor death as we understand them. The birth 
and death of human beings are not simple natural occurrences, but are 
related to a world into which single individuals, unique, unexchangeable, 
and unrepeatable entities, appear and from which they depart. Birth and 
death presuppose a world which is not in constant movement, but whose 
durability and relative permanence makes appearance and disappearance 
possible. (Arendt 1958 96-97)
This passage is easily overlooked because it is located in the chapter 
on labor, not in the parts of the book where Arendt talks about natality. 
And it has indeed often been overlooked, namely by those of her readers 
who think that, with the notion of natality, Arendt asserts a connection 
between life and action, or nature and politics. Martin Jay, for instance, 
claims that “[Arendt’s] frequent insistence on birth, or ‘natality’ as she 
insisted on calling it, as the prototype of [new beginnings] ties action 
to the rhythms of the natural world, which she usually denigrated as 
the sphere of the animal laborans” (Jay 252). Similarly, albeit in an ap-
proving rather than critical mode, Miguel Vatter (2006) and Laura 
Quintana (2009) propose that, with the notion of natality, Arendt moves 
away from and sets a counterpoint to the stark opposition of life and 
action which she assumes in other contexts. They argue against those 
commentators who, because of that opposition, see Arendt as a propo-
nent of “negative biopolitics”, i.e. of a politics that “seeks to dominate 
or exclude [mere life]”. They contend that the notion of natality shows 
that Arendt calls for –or at least allows for– a “positive biopolitics”, i.e. 
a politics that “recognizes” and “frees” the individuals’ mere life such 
that this life can “express itself” in the public sphere (Quintana 186-187, 
194-198).10 Also to be mentioned in this context is Peg Birmingham’s 
interpretation. While Birmingham does not use the term “biopolitics” 
with reference to Arendt’s position, she, too, argues that the notion 
of natality calls into question Arendt’s own opposition between life 
and action (cf. Birmingham 2006 92-93). Jay, Vatter, Quintana, and 
Birmingham arrive at this conclusion because they see the term “na-
tality” as referring to birth in the biological sense, to birth as an aspect 
of natural (or “mere”) life. The above passage proves this view wrong. 
For Arendt, natality/birth pertains only to human existence; (mere) 
10 The translations are my own. Vatter uses similar formulations.
[335]Arendt’s Notion of Natality
ideas y valores • vol. lxvi • n.o 165 • diciembre 2017 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso) 2011-3668 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 327 - 346
nature does not “know” birth.11 The notion of natality hence does not 
contradict but, to the contrary, confirms the opposition between (mere) 
life and (human) action.12
Besides being belied by the above passage, the readings of Jay, Vatter, 
Quintana, and Birmingham are also inherently problematic because 
they make Arendt’s thought seem inconsistent. All four readers indeed 
acknowledge that their interpretation of the notion of natality is –or at 
least appears to be– incompatible with the opposition of life and action 
that Arendt posits in several of her writings.13 Now, the principle of char-
ity demands that a thinker not be charged with inconsistency unless it 
is unavoidable to do so, that is, unless no consistent interpretation can 
be found. And, as I have begun to show, there is an interpretation of 
Arendt’s notion of natality that is consistent with her opposition of life 
and action. Hence, the inconsistent interpretation of the four readers 
must be rejected.14
We see now one of the reasons why Arendt’s remarks about natality 
are perplexing: She does not specify in these remarks that she employs 
“birth” in a specific sense that only applies to human beings. Why did 
she omit this important specification? She seems to have thought that 
her understanding of “birth” is the common understanding of the word. 
The fact that she uses the phrase “as we understand them” in the above 
passage gives that impression.
That Arendt uses the word “birth” in a peculiar manner is a cru-
cial piece of information, but it does not by itself resolve the puzzle. For 
the question now becomes: What is the specific, human-only sense of 
“birth” that Arendt has in mind? And in which way is birth in this sense 
–i.e. the birth of a human being– a new beginning?
11 To put the point in the Aristotelian terms in which Vatter, Quintana, and Birmingham 
discuss the issue: “Natality” refers to birth as the beginning of a bios, not to birth as 
an aspect of zoe. The notion is hence based on –rather than calling into question– the 
distinction between zoe and bios.
12 The interpretations of Vatter, Birmingham, and Quintana have been criticized along 
similar lines by Juan José Fuentes (2011).
13 Jay notes the incompatibility in the quotation I have given. Vatter deems Arendt’s op-
position of life and action to be a “lapse” on her part (cf. 148). And Birmingham explicitly 
characterizes Arendt’s thought as inconsistent (2006 23-24). Quintana, by contrast, 
argues that, despite appearances, her interpretation does not make Arendt’s position 
inconsistent (198-199). But Quintana’s argument for consistency is untenable, I think. 
She presents life (zoe) as having two facets, necessity and spontaneity. But these are con-
tradictory attributes and hence cannot be facets of the same thing. Rather, they are, 
as Arendt says, facets of two distinct and opposite things –life (zoe) and action (bios).
14 To make the point with specific reference to Vatter and Quintana: Whatever the intrin-
sic merits of “positive biopolitics” may be, there are no good grounds for associating 
Arendt with this endeavor.
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Every human being is unique
The first place to look for an answer is the passage where Arendt 
makes explicit that “birth” for her applies only to human beings. There 
she says (I repeat):
Nature and the cyclical movement into which she forces all living 
things know neither birth nor death as we understand them. The birth 
and death of human beings are not simple natural occurrences, but are 
related to a world into which single individuals, unique, unexchange-
able, and unrepeatable entities, appear and from which they depart. 
(Arendt 1958 96-97)
We can gather from these two sentences that, for Arendt, human 
birth differs from the reproduction of other species in the following 
way: The birth of a human being is the appearance of a unique, inimi-
table individual, whereas in other species the offspring is just another 
exemplar of its kind, comparable and replaceable.
But, again, the answer we find is not self-evident but requires expla-
nation. In which sense are human beings unique whereas other animals 
are not? Are not human beings, too, in certain respects comparable and 
exchangeable? And, conversely, are not all animals, and even all things, 
in a certain sense unique?
In the passage from which I quoted, the claim of human uniqueness 
is not further explained. We find an explanation in a later part of The 
Human Condition, namely when Arendt talks about human plurality. 
I therefore need to touch briefly on that topic.
“The plurality of human beings” is one of the expressions for which 
Arendt is best known. As she famously puts the point at the very beginning 
of The Human Condition, “men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit 
the world” (1958 7). Though often cited, this claim is seldom properly 
spelled out. It needs spelling out because the term “plurality” is poten-
tially misleading. In everyday language, this term is generally used as a 
synonym for multiplicity, for the condition of being more than one. But 
that cannot be all that Arendt means by it, as her claim of human plural-
ity would then be a mere triviality. The fact that there are many of us is 
certainly implied, but she must intend something more.15
15 Margaret Canovan has characterized Arendt’s claim of human plurality as “platitudinous 
but philosophically revolutionary” (110-111). This formulation is a striking oxymoron 
and as such manifests the gap between the common understanding of “plurality” and 
Arendt’s own. To remove the semblance of contradiction, Canovan’s formulation 
needs to be supplemented thus: Arendt’s claim seems platitudinous if “plurality” 
is understood in the common way but is in fact philosophically revolutionary once it is 
properly spelled out.
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Arendt expounds her notion of human plurality at the beginning of 
the fifth chapter of The Human Condition, the chapter on action. There 
she makes clear that, indeed, by “plurality” she means more than mul-
tiplicity. A plurality, for her, is not merely a collection of many elements 
but a collection of unique elements: “Human plurality”, she declares, “is 
the paradoxical plurality of unique beings” (1958 176; cf. 1958 8).
In this context, then, she explains in which sense she considers hu-
man beings, but not other animals, to be unique. She emphasizes that 
the uniqueness of human beings is to be distinguished from mere 
“otherness –the curious quality of alteritas possessed by everything 
that is” (1958 176). She thus clarifies that, when she says that each of us is 
unique, she does not merely mean that we are all somehow different, by 
our fingerprints, say, or the number of hairs on our heads. So what does 
she mean? She continues:
Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness [of human beings]. 
Through them, men distinguish themselves instead of being merely dis-
tinct; they are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not 
indeed as physical objects, but qua men. This appearance, as distinguished 
from mere bodily existence, rests on initiative, but it is an initiative from 
which no human being can refrain and still be human. (1958 176)
Arendt here refers the notion of uniqueness, and hence the no-
tion of plurality, to our capacity to act, to take initiative, to set a new 
beginning. This means that we are unique to the extent that we make 
ourselves unique, to the extent that we do not, like other animals, merely 
reproduce existing forms and ways of life but change them through our 
initiative.16 We, the multiplicity of human beings, are a plurality and 
not merely a multiplicity to the extent that we do not necessarily fall 
into fixed patterns and categories but have the capacity to depart from 
the patterns and categories of our day and thereby become unique.17
We now have an answer to the question raised in the previous sec-
tion. The birth of a human being is a new beginning insofar as it is the 
beginning of a new human life, whereby the word “new” in “new hu-
man life” is to be understood as meaning not only “distinct” but also 
“unique”. The birth of a human being is the beginning of a unique life 
16 As Richard Bernstein rightly puts it, human uniqueness and plurality is for Arendt 
“not a state of being [but] an achievement, […] a potentiality which is to be actualized” 
(223). This point is also made by Natasha Levinson (cf. 440) and Linda Zerilli (cf. 145).
17 Hence Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves puts it the wrong way when, in his book on Arendt’s 
political philosophy, he states that “by virtue of plurality, each of us is capable of acting 
and relating to others in ways that are unique and distinctive” (71). The connection 
goes the other way. It is by virtue of the capacity to act, by virtue of making ourselves 
unique, that we constitute a plurality.
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story, a story made unique by the individual’s capacity for initiative, 
by her capacity to begin.
We also now have an answer to the other, related question raised in 
the previous section, the question about Arendt’s peculiar understand-
ing of the term “birth”. Apparently, for her, this term is inextricably 
linked to the idea that something new (in the sense of unique) begins, 
and so she finds that it only applies to human beings. It seems as if, for 
her, the original meaning of “birth” –birth as the biological process of 
parturition– has been completely replaced by the metaphorical meaning: 
birth as the beginning of something new and special, as in “the birth 
of philosophy” or “the birth of our nation”. In this metaphorical sense, 
indeed, only human beings, not other animals, can be said to be born.
Circular reasoning?
At this point, Arendt’s notion of natality might seem to be clear. 
Natality means the fact of being born. And (human) birth is a new be-
ginning insofar as it is the beginning of something unique, of a unique 
life story. Thus our capacity to begin is rooted in our natality.
But, in fact, the real puzzle only begins here, because Arendt’s ar-
gument now appears to be circular. Recall that, in the above-quoted 
passage from the fifth chapter of The Human Condition, Arendt grounds 
human uniqueness in the capacity for speech and action, which is the 
capacity to begin. It is through the initiative of our words and deeds, 
she says, that we distinguish ourselves, that we make ourselves unique. 
Now, if our uniqueness thus depends on our capacity to begin, so does 
the claim that (human) birth is a new beginning, since that claim is, 
as I have shown, based on our uniqueness. That is to say, the birth of a 
human being is a new beginning insofar as every human being has the 
capacity to make her life a new beginning, the capacity to lead a life that 
does not merely reproduce established forms and ways but goes its own 
way. Arendt in fact says so explicitly in the first chapter of The Human 
Condition: “the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in 
the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of begin-
ning something anew, that is, of acting” (1958 9).
Arendt thus acknowledges that the new beginning of birth hinges on 
the capacity to begin. But in the passages cited in the second section, 
on page 332, things are said to be the other way around. Arendt there as-
serts that the capacity to begin is rooted in the new beginning of birth.
So we are faced with the following situation: We started with the 
question of how the claim of rootedness is to be understood, i.e. of how 
the capacity to begin is supposed to derive from the new beginning of 
birth. And after pursuing this question through several steps of analy-
sis, we arrived at the converse claim that the new beginning of birth 
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derives from the capacity to begin. Arendt’s remarks about natality 
thus seem to go in a circle.
The circle is most evident when we juxtapose the following two af-
firmations (already quoted): 
The very capacity for beginning is rooted in natality, in the fact that 
human beings appear in the world by virtue of birth. (1965 211)
The new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world 
only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning some-
thing anew, that is, of acting. (1958 9)
On the one hand, Arendt says that our capacity to begin springs 
from birth, yet on the other hand, she says that birth is a beginning only 
because we possess that capacity. Note that the circle is not confined 
to these two affirmations, and as such we cannot explain it away as a 
mere slip of the pen, since, as we have seen, both of them are repeated 
in other places and other words. So what is going on here? Is Arendt’s 
reasoning confused and contradictory?
One way to avoid this conclusion is the following: Basic logic tells us 
that if two notions or propositions are derivable from each other, then they 
are in fact the same thing or, more precisely, equivalent descriptions of 
the same thing. If we apply this logical principle to the present situation, it 
follows that “natality” and “capacity to begin” are equivalent descriptions 
of the same thing. Put the other way around, if “natality” and “capacity 
to begin” are meant as synonyms, then Arendt’s circular propositions are 
logically consistent.
Many readers of Arendt indeed treat “natality” and “capacity to be-
gin” as synonyms, that is, they take “natality” to be just another word 
for the capacity to begin (cf. Beiner 362; Bowen-Moore 23; Brunkhorst 
188; Dietz 102, 127; Tassin 90, 139; Lenis Castaño 37; Biss 762).18 Oddly, 
though, none of them explains why they understand “natality” in this 
18 Here are the corresponding quotations: Ronald Beiner: “What Arendt terms natal-
ity [is] the capacity to bring something entirely new into the world.” (362) Patricia 
Bowen-Moore: “The fact that man can begin something new at all is conditioned by 
and dependent upon the possession of a principle for beginning. This is his natality, his 
supreme capacity for beginning.” (23) Hauke Brunkhorst: “Natality signifies the new 
beginning inherent in human life and human action.” (188) Mary Dietz: “In Arendt’s 
phenomenology, natality […] marks the human capacity for ‘beginning something 
anew’.” (127) Étienne Tassin: “Le principe même du commencement [est] cette di-
mension de la liberté qu’Arendt nomme la ‘natalité’.” (90) John Lenis Castaño: “La 
posibilidad de comenzar algo nuevo –la natalidad, la libertad o la espontaneidad 
humana– [resulta] como la única esperanza [contra la amenaza del totalitarismo].” 
(37) Mavis Biss: “In The Human Condition, Arendt points to the potential of human 
action to initiate new beginnings, a capacity she calls natality.” (762)
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way19. This lack of explanation is odd because, as far as I know, Arendt 
never explicitly equates “natality” and “capacity to begin” and because, 
as we will see, there are important reasons for not treating the two ex-
pressions as synonyms.20 It looks as if these readers have been led by 
the appearance of circularity to draw the logical inference I suggested, 
but do not recognize that this understanding of “natality” is not un-
problematic and not generally accepted.21
Let us examine what this understanding entails. What does it mean 
to consider “natality” to be a synonym for “the capacity to begin”? Taken 
literally, “natality” signifies the condition of being born, and as such it 
is not the same as “the capacity to begin”. To say that “natality” signi-
fies the capacity to begin therefore means that the term should not be 
taken literally but as a metaphor. That the aforementioned readers treat 
the two expressions as synonyms hence appears to be based on the fol-
lowing view: In Arendt’s remarks about natality, birth as the starting 
point of a human life operates as a metaphor for the new beginning of 
which the individual is capable. In other words, birth as the starting 
point of a human life represents symbolically the new beginning that 
the individual, through her words and deeds, may eventually make.
That Arendt uses the terms “natality” and “birth” metaphorically 
has already been suggested at the end of the previous section, when I 
discussed why, for her, “birth” applies only to human beings. There 
I noted that, apparently, this word is for her inextricably linked to the 
19 Also to be mentioned in this context are the readers –cited at the very beginning of the 
paper– who consider the notion of natality to be Arendt’s most defining contribution. 
That these readers attach such significance to this notion suggests –even if they do not 
say so explicitly– that they are taking “natality” to be synonymous with “capacity to 
begin”, for it is the idea of that capacity, and not so much natality in the literal sense, 
that is central to Arendt’s thought. The case of Bowen-Moore’s book illustrates this 
point very well. Bowen-Moore does explicitly equate “natality” and “capacity to begin” 
(see the preceding footnote), and it is clearly for this reason that she considers the no-
tion of natality so important to devote an entire book to it. She sees “natality” present 
in a great many facets of Arendt’s thought: childhood, education, politics, promising, 
forgiving, totalitarianism, love, thinking, willing, judging… This profusion of “natal-
ity” in Bowen-Moore’s book is the result of her equation of “natality” and “capacity to 
begin”. Arendt herself does not use the term “natality” in most of these contexts, but 
she does, in all of them, draw a connection to the capacity to begin.
20 It is especially odd in Bowen-Moore’s case that she does not explain why she takes 
“natality” to be a synonym for “capacity to begin”, considering that her whole book is 
based on this supposition.
21 This criticism also applies to my former self. In my doctoral dissertation, I expressed 
the view that “Arendt’s notion of natality […] is just a special term for [the capacity to 
begin]” (Totschnig 24). With the present paper, I mean to retract and replace this view.
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idea that something new and unique begins. Thus, it seems that she uses 
“natality” and “birth”, respectively, as a metaphor for new beginning.
It is hence undeniable that the metaphorical interpretation possesses 
a certain plausibility. It is suggested by Arendt’s peculiar understand-
ing of the term “birth” and by the apparent circularity of her remarks 
about natality. However, it does not solve the puzzle I highlighted at 
the beginning, the puzzle of how to understand Arendt’s claim that the 
capacity to begin is rooted in natality. Quite the contrary, under this 
interpretation the puzzle becomes even more acute. If “natality” were 
a metaphor for the new beginning of which the individual is capable, 
the claim of rootedness would become vacuous, even nonsensical. 
For the claim would then mean, when spelled out, that the capacity 
to begin is rooted in the new beginning brought about by exercising 
the capacity to begin, or, put more simply, that the capacity to begin 
is rooted in the exercise of the capacity to begin. And that is a rather 
empty statement, if it makes any sense at all. It is difficult to believe 
that this is what Arendt had in mind, especially when we recall that 
she reiterated the claim in every major work and so, apparently, con-
sidered it to express an important point.22
Newcomers in the web of human relationships
In “On Violence”, Arendt glosses the term “natality” by saying that 
“we come into the world by virtue of birth, as newcomers and beginnings” 
22 The metaphorical interpretation of Arendt’s notion of natality has been criticized along 
similar lines by Nathan Van Camp (cf. 181-183). In its stead, Van Camp proposes a novel 
interpretation of his own (cf. 185-189). Drawing on a footnote in The Human Condition 
(cf. Arendt 1958 177, n. 1), he argues that, when Arendt affirms a connection between birth 
and the capacity to begin, she means that, because humans are born prematurely, they 
are “in desperate need of protection and care by the social group” and thus “biologically 
conditioned to engage in politico-linguistic action” (Van Camp 187). I believe that Van 
Camp’s interpretation, while appealing in its clarity, is questionable on several grounds. 
First of all, the argument he presents seems to be a non sequitur. Our premature birth 
indeed puts us in need of protection by the social group, but such need for social pro-
tection does not entail action and new beginnings in Arendt’s sense. Bees or ants also 
rely on the social group for survival, yet they do very well without Arendtian action. 
Second, Van Camp’s reading of the footnote on which he draws is debatable because 
it is not clear that the phrase “this description” at the beginning of the footnote refers, 
as Van Camp assumes, to Arendt’s mention of natality in the corresponding passage. 
It may –and my sense is that it does– refer to an earlier part of that passage, namely 
to Arendt’s claim that the “insertion into the human world” is “not forced upon us by 
necessity, like labor, and not prompted by utility, like work”. Finally, if the argument 
presented by Van Camp were what Arendt had in mind, we would expect her to say so 
explicitly, not merely hint at it obliquely in a footnote.
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(1972 179).23 I would now like to propose an interpretation of the claim of 
rootedness that takes its bearings from this passage, and in particular 
from the word “newcomers”. I contend that, when Arendt says that the 
capacity to begin is rooted in natality, what she means by “natality” is 
neither the biological process of parturition nor, metaphorically, the 
capacity to begin itself, but the arrival of newcomers in the web of hu-
man relationships.
Let me explain. “The web of human relationships” is an expression 
that Arendt coins in The Human Condition (cf. 1958 183-184). It stands 
for the manifold network of interpersonal relations –relations of affec-
tion, friendship, cooperation, authority, obligation, etc.– that constitute 
the human world. Now, every child that is born is a newcomer to this 
web of relationships and consequently induces changes in it. The people 
close to the child must build a relationship with her, which may lead 
them to change their relationships with others. Conversely, the child 
must build relationships with those who tend to her, and soon enough 
she will begin to develop relationships with strangers. To put the point 
more concretely: When a child is born, the parents must establish a 
relationship with her, and the child with them. That will affect the rela-
tionship of the parents to each other, to the grandparents, to their friends, 
and to others.24 A couple of months or years later, at the playground or 
in kindergarten, the child will begin to get to know other children, and 
through her initiative her parents will engage with other parents. This 
process will continue when she starts school and then, later on, when 
she enters the public sphere as an adult. Thus, because of the newcomer, 
new threads are woven and new connections tied in the web of human 
relationships, while some old threads may be loosened and some old 
connections undone. In short, the birth of every child stirs up the web 
of relationships and so prevents it from petrifying.
Upon a closer look, we can see that Arendt refers to this aspect of 
(human) birth in several of the passages about natality, albeit in a way 
23 See section 2,  page 332, for the whole passage. At the beginning of The Human Condition, 
Arendt similarly speaks of “the constant influx of newcomers who are born into the 
world as strangers” (1958 9).
24 As Fernando Bárcena has noted, the web of relationships begins to be stirred up even 
before the actual birth, namely as soon as the child is expected: “¿Cómo justificar el 
recurso a una noción que tiene su asiento en un fenómeno natural y biológico como 
es el nacimiento para explicar la naturaleza de la vida de la polis, que es un fenómeno 
humano que va más allá de la naturaleza? […] Quizá un principio de respuesta a [esta 
interrogante] lo podemos encontrar en aquello que escribía Rahel Varnhagen, cuya 
vida biografió la propia Arendt: ‘Mi vida comenzó antes de mi nacimiento’. Y es que 
un niño, un infante, es llamado, nombrado, narrado antes de su aparición en el mundo, 
antes de su mismo nacer fáctico. La infancia es anticipada antes del nacimiento” (110). 
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that is not immediately evident, namely when she says that, through birth, 
new human beings “appear in the world”.25 By “world”, Arendt does not 
mean the universe, or all there is, but the artificial home that we, human 
beings, create for ourselves within the universe (cf. 1958 2, 136-139). The 
web of human relationships is one essential component of the world in 
this sense (cf. 1958 182-183). (The other essential component is the durable 
things –dwellings, furniture, and clothes, but also tools and machines– 
which we build in order to protect ourselves from, and employ for our 
benefit, the forces of nature.) When Arendt says that, through birth, 
new human beings appear in the world, she is thus, implicitly, referring 
to the fact that the web of human relationships is constantly shaken up 
and altered by the appearance of newcomers.26
So every (human) birth spurs the creation of interpersonal rela-
tionships. And this means that it spurs action, since the creation of 
interpersonal relationships is action in Arendt’s sense. Every creation 
of a new relationship –a new friendship, a new cooperation, a new ap-
prenticeship, etc.– is, in its own right, a small new beginning, and it 
may grow into or become part of a greater new beginning. Hence the 
point of the preceding paragraph can also be formulated in terms of 
action: The child must act in order to establish a place in the world, in 
the web of human relationships, and she thereby forces the people she 
meets to respond to her initiative, i.e. to act in return. Thus, every birth 
is a source of action. As Arendt puts it in “The Concept of History”, 
“through [the fact of natality] the human world is constantly invaded 
by strangers, newcomers whose actions and reactions cannot be fore-
seen by those who are already there” (2006 61).27
25 Besides the passage from Crises of the Republic cited at the beginning of this section, 
see the passage from On revolution cited on page 332, and the passage from The Human 
Condition cited on page 334.
26 I thank Claudia Hilb for making me aware of this point.
27 Lewis and Sandra Hinchman find this idea of Arendt “largely implausible” because, 
“although all ‘newcomers’ have the potential to develop unanticipated perspectives, 
they are immediately subjected to processes of socialization that transform them from 
pieces of nature into members of ongoing communities”. Hence, they contend, “the 
biological fact of natality in itself permits but hardly guarantees plurality, freedom, 
and innovation” (Hinchman and Hinchman 169-170). However, they themselves 
suggest a reply to this criticism, namely when they note, in the same passage, that “in 
practice, of course, complete socialization rarely succeeds”. For this remark to be a 
valid response on Arendt’s behalf to their objection, the word “rarely” simply needs 
to be replaced by “never”. That Arendt would make this replacement is shown by her 
claim, in “The Concept of History”, that “even the predictability of human behavior 
which political terror can enforce for relatively long periods of time is hardly able to 
change the very essence of human affairs once and for all; it can never be sure of its 
own future” (2006 60-61).
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The insight that every (human) birth is a source of action brings 
us close to Arendt’s claim of rootedness, but not quite all the way. For 
Arendt does not just say that birth is a source of action, but that it is 
the source of the capacity for action. And that is a significantly stron-
ger claim. Not only the exercise of the capacity to begin, but the very 
capacity is supposed to derive from the condition of birth. On my in-
terpretation, this stronger claim can be understood if we consider that 
birth is necessarily –not just possibly– a source of action. The child must 
act, she must establish a place in the existing web of relationships, and 
she thereby forces others to act too, to respond to her initiative. Every 
birth thus calls for action, both from the child and from others. And so, 
to the extent that a capacity is brought about –and kept alive– by that 
which makes the capacity necessary, the condition of birth can be said 
to be the source of the capacity for action. In other words, this capac-
ity depends on that condition in the sense that, without the constant 
arrival of newcomers, it would probably atrophy and eventually disap-
pear. This, then, is what Arendt means, I submit, when she says that the 
human capacity to begin is rooted in natality.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude the paper with a remark on the significance 
of the notion of natality as I have construed it. At the beginning of The 
Human Condition, Arendt asserts that natality “may be the central 
category of political […] thought” (1958 9). At first glance, this claim 
seems strangely hyperbolic. Why should natality, of all things, be the central 
political notion? My interpretation allows us to understand the claim. 
Natality as the constant arrival of newcomers underlies the continuing 
existence of the realm of politics. If there were no newcomers through 
birth, human society would sooner or later find a stable configuration, 
a perpetual form of organization, and the political realm –in the nar-
row sense that Arendt gives to the term, i.e. the realm of action and new 
beginnings– would thus vanish. The unending arrival of newcomers, 
who develop their own perspectives and opinions, prevents this kind 
of immobilization and keeps the political realm alive. In this sense, 
indeed, natality is central to politics.
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